Management Summary
The Dutch 'Female Board Index 2008' provides The Dutch 'Female Board Index' also analyses the differences between male and female executive directors and supervisors ('non-executive directors') and between companies with or without female representation on their Board of Directors and/or Supervisory Boards (together the 'Board').
The study showed that:
• • Of the 831 executive directors and non-executive directors in the sample, 47 (5.7%) are female. This is the weighted average of the percentage of female executive directors (2.0%) and the percentage of female non-executive directors (7.7%). There has been no change in the number of female executive directors in 2008; their number remained constant at six.
The number of female non-executive directors increased with four, from 37 (6.8% 2 ) in 2007 to 41 (7.7%) in 2008.
• The average age of the six female executive directors and 41 female non-executive directors is 49 and 56 years respectively, which is, respectively, approximately two and six years younger than their male colleagues. • The average tenure of the female executive directors and non-executive directors is 4.3 and 3.3 years respectively; this is 1.1 years longer and 1.3 years less than the average tenure of their male colleagues.
• Of the 47 female executive directors and non-executive directors, 23 women (48.9%) do not have the Dutch nationality, as opposed to 26.4% of the men. Five out of the six female executive directors do not have Dutch nationality; the only female executive director with Dutch nationality was one of the founders of the company (Veldhuis of Holland Colours).
• The industries 3 comprising relatively most companies with women on their Board of Directors and/or Supervisory Board are the sectors 'Basic Materials' (75% of four companies has female directors) and 'Financials' sector (40% of fifteen companies); no companies in 'Oil and Gas' (0% of two companies) and 'Healthcare' (0% of five companies) had female representation on either their Board of Directors or Supervisory
Board.
• and also the lowest percentage of female directors (2.4%).
• The data were examined on individual level (section 2) and at company level (section 3).
Statistical tests were used to investigate whether there is a relationship between variables (correlation and chi-square test), and whether there are differences between the variables (ttest The total number of female directors increased from 43 in 2007 to 47 in 2008 (see Table 2 ). This is the net increase, while nine female non-executive directors 6 were appointed and five 7 resigned during the year 2008. 
Multiple board seats
The 47 board seats occupied by women are taken by 41 different women (see Table 3 ). Some women have multiple board seats. Marike Lier-Lels takes the maximum number of positions with women: she is appointed to three supervisory boards (KPN, TKH and USGPeople). 
Top 10 companies with female directors
The 113 companies are ranked, based on the percentage of women appointed to the combined executive and supervisory board. Companies with relatively most female directors are at the top of the list, descending to companies with relatively the least female (no) female directors.
The rank of the 79 companies with no women on the board decreases for larger boards while a company with ten directors has more opportunities to appoint a woman than a company with four directors. Table 4 shows the top ten companies with most female directors in the combined executive and supervisory board. Also this table includes the names of female executive directors (bold) and non-executive directors. (Table 13 in the appendix, shows the ranking of all 113 companies) 
Characteristics of female directors
The profile of the female directors, and the comparison in relation to their male colleagues, is analysed with respect to age, tenure and nationality. The average ages are listed in Table 5 . The average age of all 831 directors is 57.8 years. The 47 women in the total sample are on average three years younger than their male colleagues (54.9 years compared to 57.9 years for men). This difference is larger for male and female non-executive directors. The average age of the 494 male non-executive directors is 61.1 years compared to 55.7 years for the 41 female non-executive directors, a difference of 5.4 years. The difference in age between male and female non-executive directors is statistically significant. A small majority of the women (53%) serves less than three years in the Board of Directors and/or Supervisory Board, for the men this is true for 41%. Among the 784 men 12% serves longer than ten years as a director, while for the women this is only 6% (this applies to one female executive director, Veldhuis, the founder of Holland Colours and since 1992 on the Board of Directors of this company). Table 6 shows the differences in average tenure between male and female directors. The average tenure is 4.9 years for all 831 directors. The average tenure for the 784 men is 5.0 years, and the 47 women serve on average one year less on their board position function (4.0 years). The difference in tenure for the executive directors is 1.1 years; the female executive directors serve longer on the Board of Directors than their male colleagues. This is caused by the long tenure of Veldhuis. The female non-executive directors had (significantly) shorter tenure than the male non-executive directors, the difference is 1.4 years.
Nationality
The nationality is known of 828 individuals (99%). Of these 828 directors 597 people (72.1%)
have Dutch nationality, and 231 people (27.9%) have another nationality. The nationality that is most represented besides Dutch nationality is the American nationality and the British nationality. 17% of all female directors is from the United States and 11% is from the United Kingdom, the percentages are respectively 5% and 4% for male directors. 
Characteristics of companies with female directors
In addition to the analysis of the characteristics of the directors described in the previous section, this section analyses the differences between companies with and without women in the board. This is done using a relative measure and an absolute measure. The relative measure is the percentage of women appointed to the board, being 0% for the 79 companies without women in the executive or supervisory board and range from 4.3% to 36.4% in 34 companies with one or more women in the board. By means of this relative measure, the correlation with other company characteristics is calculated such as the relationship with the size of the company or the size of the respective boards. The absolute measure of the presence of female directors divides companies in two categories: the category of companies with women in the board and the category companies without women in the board.
3.1

Board size
The relationship between the presence of female directors and the size of the board (differences between companies with and without female directors) and the correlation between the size of the board and the percentage of women are shown in Table 8 . Table 8 shows that the 34 companies with female directors have an average combined board size of 9.6 directors; this is on average 3.2 directors more than companies with all-male executive and supervisory boards. The supervisory board for companies with female non-executive directors is also significantly bigger than the (all-male) supervisory boards of companies without female directors (6.6 non-executives versus 4.0 non-executive directors). On average, the Board of Directors consists of 2.6 executive directors, but the Board of Directors of companies with female executive directors has an additional 0.7 director appointed (total 3.3 executive directors). It is clear that the increase in the average size of the Supervisory Board is not caused by (only) the women, while the increase in board size is greater than the number of female non-executive directors in the board. 
Industry
The 113 companies are divided into nine 8 industries according to the Industry Classification Benchmark ('ICB') as used by Euronext. Figure 6 shows the number of companies in each sector and the number of companies with female directors. The breakdown of the number of companies with female directors of the total number of companies per sectors is shown in Table 9Figure 6. Besides the Telecom-sector 9 , the industry with relatively most companies with women in the board is the 'basic materials' industry (75% of four companies has one or more female directors), followed by the 'financials' (40% of fifteen financials has one or more female directors). However, due to the above average board size of the financial companies, the percentage female directors (5%) of the total board is below the average of all companies (6%). No women are appointed to the board in the 'oil and gas' industry (two companies) or in the 'healthcare' industry (five companies).
8 Euronext classifies companies in ten industries, including the sector: utilities. However in the Netherlands no utilities are listed at Euronext Amsterdam. In the Dutch Female Board Index 2007 the SIC-industry classification was used, and companies were divided into seven industries. In this study the ICB-classification as used by Euronext is used while it appeara to be more accurate in the Netherlands. 9 KPN is the only remaining telecom company on Euronext Amsterdam and while KPN has two female nonexecutive directors it ensures that for the Telecom-sector 100% of the companies has female directors. 
Comparison by Euronext-indices (AEX, AMX, AScX)
The 113 companies are also categorised by their trading segment on the Amsterdam Euronext.
The segments are based on the three share indices: the AEX-index (max 25 most actively traded shares, the large caps), the AMX-index (max 25 medium size, midcap, shares) and the AsxX-index (made up by max 25 most traded small caps). Figure 7 shows the breakdown of the number of companies within each segment and the number of companies with female directors. 
Gender diversity and corporate governance
Diversity in the context of corporate governance is described by Van der Walt and Ingley linked to other aspects of corporate governance. For example, it also relates to the importance of a good relationship with stakeholders (stakeholder theory, Donaldson and Davis (1991) and resource dependence theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) , diversity as a measure of independence (agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) ), and diversity as necessary for fair and transparent decision-making et cetera.
Can demographic characteristics of a director have so much impact on a company, that is improves performance? Two reasons suggest that the composition of the Board affects the performance of a company (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) . First, inherent in the position of the Board, the Board has the most influence on the strategic decisions of a company. And secondly, the Board also has a supervisory role in the sense that it represents the shareholder, it responds to takeover threats and keeps the total value of the company in mind. If individual members within the board determine the decision-making, the composition of the board will affect the performance of a company. The factor "time" is a complicating factor for research into the effect of the composition of the board. Just because the Board affects the strategic decisions, the effects on firm-performance are probably not measurable on the short-term.
This also applies to a changing composition of the board (such as a more diverse board).
Arguments used for more diversity in the Board
In the literature, various arguments are used why the representation of women in the board leads to better decision-making in the boardroom. The presence of women improves team performance, as more diverse teams consider a greater range of perspectives, which leads to better decisions. These better decisions would ultimately lead to higher business value and business performance (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004 , Carter et al, 2003 , Lückerath-Rovers, 2009 ). Diversity would contribute to the discussion, exchange of ideas and the performance of the group. Diversity provides the Board as a whole with new insights and perspectives to consider which improves the value of the organisation and its performance (Kang, Cheng and Gray, 2007) . However, considering more perspectives can also be more time consuming and lead to an increase in the number of conflicts. The counter-balancing of more perspectives also might slow down the decision-making process and may eventually also ensure that the Board will be more divided than in a less diverse board (Rose, 2007) . Dwyer et al. (2003) show that diverse top management teams also are more expensive and difficult to coordinate than homogeneous teams and that the increased costs might be higher than the increase of financial performance. Brammer et al, (2007) argue that the arguments for more women in the board can be seen from an economic perspective and from a moral perspective; both can be divided into arguments for equal opportunities and for equal representation.
Economic arguments
Equal opportunities
The economic case for equal opportunities for women in the Board focus on the fact that the absence of women sub-optimal for the company. The failure to choose the most suitable candidate affects the financial performance of the company. The absence of women in the top of the company may thus be a signal of a less than optimal operating company. If we assume that some valuable characteristics properties are not evenly distributed on demographic groups, the company is structural excluding these valuable characteristics by excluding women from decision-making positions. Companies with a higher degree of diversity in the Board give a positive signal to (potential) employees of a company, enhancing the competitive situation within (between existing employees) and outside the company (between potential employees) (Rose, 2007) and performance will improve (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . Well-qualified (external) candidates for directorships notice that they may be eligible for a vacant position, even if they are outside the circle from which normally directors are recruited. In addition, diversity improves competition among employees (and their performance) because of the positive signal for the 'minorities' that everyone can achieve a director's position, regardless of his or hers demographic characteristics.
Equal representation
The economic case for equal representation refers to the direct and indirect interest that the Board reflects the (demographic characteristics of) stakeholders of the company such as consumers, employees and investors. A more diverse board provides a better understanding of the markets and customers of the companies. Also our society esteems a higher degree of diversity as positive, so improving the reputation of the company. Diversity within the company and its Board that reflects diversity within the relevant market will enable a company to better serve and retain these markets (Carter et al, 2003 , Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 , and Donaldson and Davis, 1991 .
Moral arguments
The arguments for equal opportunities say that it is wrong to keep individuals away from the board just because of gender or race, regardless of ability. That is a form of discrimination.
The arguments for equal representation focus on the fact that the presence of more women in the Board would be a more fair and equitable outcome for our society. The moral arguments are based on the social responsibility of companies and their directors, "being a good corporate citizen, for example, do not discriminate, the observance of (social) values (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003, Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . On the other hand, argues Rose ( • De gemiddelde leeftijd van de zes vrouwelijke bestuurders en 41 vrouwelijke commissarissen is respectievelijk 49 en 56 jaar, ongeveer twee resp. zes jaar jonger dan hun mannelijke collega's.
• • De sector met relatief de meeste bedrijven met vrouwen in RvB en / of RvC zijn de sector 'materialen' (75% van vier bedrijven) en de 'financiële' sector (40% van vijftien bedrijven) 13 ; geen enkel bedrijf in de sectoren 'olie en gas' (0% van twee bedrijven) en 'gezondheidszorg ' (0% van vijf bedrijven) hebben vrouwelijke vertegenwoordiging in hun RvB of RvC.
• Bedrijven met vrouwelijke vertegenwoordiging in hun RvB en / of de RvC hebben een (substantieel) gemiddeld grotere RvB en RvC (zowel afzonderlijk als gecombineerd) dan bedrijven zonder vrouwen. Dit verschil is groter dan enkel het vrouwelijke lid.
• AEX-bedrijven (large caps) zijn de bedrijven met het vaakst minimaal een vrouw in hun 
